Can the doctrine of The Fall be saved?

Suppose we boil the doctrine of The Fall down to the following basic thesis:

(F) The disobedient acts of the first human persons ruined all of creation and caused God to be hidden.

According to tradition, 'ruined all of creation' explains why the world contains as much pain, suffering, disaster, and mortality as it does. In short, we are told that (F) entails something like the further thesis

(E) The disobedient acts of the first human persons are the reason that the world contains pain, suffering, disaster, and mortality.

But we have every empirical reason to reject (E). We know from, e.g., the fossil record that creatures have been suffering and eating each other and dying for hundreds of millions of years prior to the activity of any human persons. So, we know that (E) is false. By modus tollens, (F) must be false too.
Which raises two questions: To what extent does the tradition still endorse (F) and (E)? If, on the other hand, the tradition gave up on (F) and (E), approximately when?

The extent to which 20th century analytic philosophers of religion have, e.g., defended premises and assumptions such that natural evil is a necessary condition for the observed regularities of the natural world, which regularities are themselves in turn necessary for the acquisition and development of moral knowledge in human persons. What's become a commonplace in discussions of the problem of divine hiddenness -- that it is necessary for God to hide in order to protect his creatures from epistemic coercion -- explicitly contradicts (F). Another prominent example might be Plantinga's suggestion that it is possible that each and every human person suffers from transworld depravity, according to which, for every human person, there is no possible world in which that person performs only morally good actions. Insofar as tradition emphasizes that The Fall is a human failure, it may create tension to think that every world that contains human persons was unavoidably bound to be a fallen world.

The Dilemma of Freedom in Eden

Traditional versions of Christianity appear to be inconsistent in a variety of ways. The following example is one way to draw this out. First, a very simple telling of the Christian story.

God created human persons to be free, and in the Garden human persons enjoyed this freedom in the presence of God. Human persons abused their freedom, the story goes, and chose to chase God away. Once God was chased away, creation has been ruined ever since, and God must remain hidden. This situation is irrevocable, unless God accomplishes the Incarnation and Atonement, which opens the possibility for human persons once again to be free and in the presence of God. This reunion must wait until heaven, however. Furthermore, not all human persons will choose to be reunited with God in heaven. Some will continue to use their freedom in order to freely reject God, and these human persons will spend the afterlife in hell.

That is the story. And the story entails the following dilemma.

(1) Adam is in Garden, enjoys creaturely freedom in the presence of God, and *has* the ability to chase God away.

(2) Adam is in Heaven, enjoys creaturely freedom in the presence of God, and *lacks* the ability to chase God away.

(1) and (2) can't both be true. They are inconsistent. Which means that the story itself is inconsistent, because it entails an inconsistent set of consequences. Which means the story is false.

One way to resolve this dilemma would be to add a third statement which could render (1) and (2) consistent, such as the following:

(3) The words 'creaturely freedom' denote one type of freedom in the Garden, and a distinct type of freedom in Heaven.

The set of (1) through (3) is consistent. Though, now you'll have to modify the story, in order to reflect (3). Which, reveals a further dilemma:

(4) Adam has Garden-freedom in the Garden, and this is the creaturely freedom that God intended for Adam to have when he created Adam.

(5) Adam has Heaven-freedom in Heaven, and this is the creaturely freedom that God intended for Adam to have when he created Adam.

(4) and (5) can't both be true. So, insofar as our story entails (1) through (5), our story is still false. As before, we might add an additional statement:

(6) When God created Adam, God intended Adam to have one type of freedom in the Garden and another distinct type of freedom in Heaven.

As before, (1) through (6) are consistent, and we can modify the story accordingly. Though, it is doubtful whether the story can be modified without doing damage to many versions of the traditional Christian account.

For example, many versions of the traditional Christian account seem to entail something along the lines of the following:

(7) Heaven is God's way of restoring creation back to the way God intended it to be.

Even if (7) is a rough way to put it, the general idea seems clear. But, (6) and (7) are inconsistent.

(6) When God created Adam, God intended Adam to have one type of freedom in the Garden and another distinct type of freedom in Heaven. 

(7) Heaven is God's way of restoring creation back to the way God intended it to be.

Insofar as (6) and (7) are inconsistent, and that the story entails (6) and (7), the story is false.

Are creatures morally obligated to worship God?

Given that God is wise and powerful and loving, given that he sustains creation from moment to moment, given that he is praiseworthy -- are creatures morally obligated to worship God? Perhaps the Christian tradition does entail that creatures are morally obligated because of such reasons to do certain things: worship God, ask God for forgiveness, seek salvation. Or, put another way, it is reasonable to think that the tradition entails that, say, failure to worship God is sinful, which the existence of a moral obligation to worship God would neatly explain.

The existence of such a moral obligation, though, might be seen to undercut typical responses to the problem of divine hiddenness.

For example, if creatures are morally obligated to worship God, this obligation seems to be less straightforward and mundane than the rest of our moral obligations (e.g., being kind, keeping promises, supporting loved ones). Which might tend one to think that God would have to take the unique non-obviousness of this obligation into consideration when carrying out his hiddenness campaign.

Does Satan have creaturely freedom?

According to the traditional account, Satan is a fallen angel (or, at least, a fallen creature). That Satan is fallen entails that Satan has creaturely freedom. Satan's fall was presumably temporally prior to Adam and Eve's fall (in other words, The Fall). And, presumably, Satan's being fallen is a result of Satan's disobeying God in some way.

While the traditional account explains that the cause of The Fall was Adam and Eve's disobedience, tradition is curiously silent about why it was human disobedience which caused The Fall and not Satan's.

One possibility is that Satan's disobedience did in fact result in a Primeval Fall which was temporally prior to The Fall. Perhaps it was the Primeval Fall which first ruined creation. If the Primeval Fall occurred millions or billions of years ago, this might even neatly explain why so-called natural evil is (very much) more ancient than The Fall.

Perhaps there is support in the tradition for the idea that the Primeval Fall took place 'in Heaven' -- or perhaps, in other words at least, a creaturely location that is nonlocally related to Earth. At any rate, according to tradition, Satan is spatiotemporally located in The Garden when he tempts Adam and Eve.

The details are unfortunately unclear, however, leaving us with a handful of difficulties.

First, suppose a Primeval Fall transpired in Heaven. Even Heaven is susceptible to the effects of creaturely freedom. This would suggest that creaturely freedom leads unavoidably to disobedience. For the purposes of the afterlife, then, God would have need to restrict the freedom of human persons in Heaven in order to prevent another Fall.

Second, the strongest replies to atheological Divine Hiddenness arguments involve a premise along the lines of 'God must be hidden in order to protect the epistemic and cognitive freedom of his creatures.' But the fact of a heavenly Primeval Fall would establish that being in the full presence of God does not compromise creaturely freedom.

Third, on the other hand, there is the conceptual difficulty of explaining how it is that Satan -- a rational free agent with full knowledge and experience of the presence of God -- rejects God. What rational grounds could Satan have for freely rejecting God, and unrepentantly so?