Compensatory Afterlife or 'Drop in the Bucket' Theodicy

I'm not a fan of compensatory afterlife thinking, which would view earthly pain and suffering as a mere 'drop in the bucket' compared to heaven. Even when one's earthly life is dominantly characterized by suffering, billions and billions of years in the afterlife will more than make up for it.

First off, I'm not even sure

(1) Uncountable billions of years in heaven will help you forget about any earthly pain and suffering you had

is false. For all I know (1) is true. But (1) doesn't explain (much less justify) the existence of earthly pain and suffering. In order to justify the pain and suffering, we'd need some details, perhaps along the lines of

(2) Earthly life is a time of soul-making, in which souls are prepared for the afterlife

and

(3) Pain and suffering are necessary for soul-making

and

(4) The afterlife will more than compensate a person for any earthly pain and suffering

and

(5) The value of the quality of a person's earthly life pales in comparison to the value of the quality of a person's afterlife

The conjunction of (2) through (5) could be the start of a compensatory theodicy.

There seems to be a prima facie tension here. The theodicy implies that (and I'm just going to make up some numbers for the purpose of illustration) 0.0000001% years of badness is justified by 99.9999999% years of goodness.

Does the theodicist really want to stand behind this ratio, though? That is, does the theodicist really want to endorse (5)? One might wonder to what extent God endorses (5), if on Resurrection Day God judges how each person will spend 99.9999999% of his or her life based upon how they spent the 0.0000001% of it. In other words, God does not seem to consider the value of the quality of one's earthly life as a mere 'drop in the bucket' at all. God seems to weigh the quality of that 0.0000001% as much as he does the 99.9999999%. In which case, God seems to reject (5).

Does compensatory theodicy undermine itself? Insofar as (2) through (5) are inconsistent, it seems so.

Which 'me' will God resurrect?

There is a basic complication for Christian views of resurrection and afterlife that I don't see discussed very often.

Suppose I live to be 100 years old. On Resurrection Day, when God gets to my name on the list, God might resurrect 100-year-old me. But why that version of me? Why not resurrect 48-year-old me, or 21-year-old me? If I'm going to be around for eternity, I'd like to be young and healthy!

You get the idea.

But this situation is not unique to me, nor to people who grow old to be 100. What about, say, infants who die prematurely? They seem to be the opposite case.

Let's not suppose that God is arbitrary about which 'me' to resurrect -- but if God isn't arbitrary, what sort of non-arbitrary principle could he apply when making his decision?

One might theorize that there is, for each of us, an essence, or haecceity, and resurrection essentially involves embodying each person's essence. Of course, the soul might just as well fit this role, and perhaps this 'problem' is really the makings of a Christian argument for substance dualism.

Off the top of my head, it doesn't seem as though essences or souls would be of much help. Rather, it would only translate the problem. Instead of the question 'Which physical body do I resurrect?' the question would become 'Which set of properties do I instantiate (by resurrecting which physical body)?' or 'Which body do I put this soul into -- the 21-year-old body or the 100-year-old body?'

In the case of an infant who dies prematurely, it seems particularly clear that even the soul would be of no help in guiding God's decision regarding resurrection, insofar as it seems to represent a sort of worst case scenario in which an infant soul spends eternity in the body of an infant who died prematurely.

Resurrection, Hell, and Final Judgment

Let's suppose that a hypothetical person named McJones, a virtuous and well-liked husband, father, and grandfather, who died of old age and natural causes in the year 1952, was a committed atheist and unbeliever in God.

On the Day of Final Judgment, one of God's decisions to consider is whether to resurrect McJones.

For the purposes of this example, I am assuming that 'Day of Final Judgment' and 'Resurrection Day' are two ways of saying the same thing, and perhaps this is a harmless assumption. I am also assuming  that some form of materialism is true of human persons, which entails that McJones really is dead and that God really would need to resurrect McJones in order for McJones to stand before God on this day. Finally, let's assume that God is apprised and aware of all of the biographical details regarding McJones' virtue and unbelief.

Given these assumptions, is it reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones on the Day of Final Judgment?

Suppose some universalist theory is true, according to which everyone goes to heaven. In this case, considering that McJones was virtuous and well-liked in life, it seems reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones in order that McJones may appear before judgment and proceed to heaven.

Suppose that no universalist theory is true, however, and so not everyone qualifies for heaven. Furthermore, suppose that the biographical details of McJones' unbelief are sufficient to disqualify McJones from heaven. Finally, let's assume that God, because he was apprised of these biographical details at the time, understood this disqualification in 1952.

Given these assumptions, is it reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones on the Day of Final Judgment?

There are at least three cases:

(1) God resurrects McJones. McJones stands before judgment. McJones is banished to hell.

(2) God resurrects McJones. McJones stands before judgment. God annihilates McJones.

(3) God declines to resurrect McJones.

Of these three options, I think it is most reasonable to think that God chooses (3) and declines to resurrect McJones.

Every Retributivist Theory of Hell is a Failure

Call any theory of hell according to which God consigns human persons to hell in order to mete out the just punishment for their sins a retributivist theory of hell (hereafter, R-theory).

My claim is this: If any R-Theory of hell is true, then I have no reason to be afraid of hell. In support of this claim, I will provide a cluster of interrelated arguments.

I will employ no theological premises. Instead, my arguments will rest entirely upon rational moral principles which any reasonable person can be expected to accept. And this approach is fitting and appropriate, considering that R-theories are characteristically spelled out in terms of a rational moral framework of justice (e.g., crime and punishment).

For purposes of convenience, here is a list of the rational principles I will appeal to for support.

(MP1) Every crime must either be punished or pardoned.
(MP2) Any person who commits a crime ought to serve the punishment for that crime, unless it has been pardoned.
(MP3) Any punishment must fit the crime.
(MP4) For any crime, if that crime has been pardoned, then there exists a just and reasonable basis for which pardon has been granted.
(MP5) It is unjust to punish any person for a crime they didn't commit.
(MP6) It is not the case that a person who has been both convicted and pardoned of a crime is therefore obligated to accept either the conviction or the pardon for that crime.
(MP7) The punishment for any crime that has been justly pardoned is stayed.

Those are the principles. Here is the cluster of arguments.

ARGUMENT 1
Assume some R-theory of hell is true. Either I'm guilty of crimes that deserve punishment in hell, or I'm not. If I'm not guilty, then no worries, by MP5 I can't be sent to hell. Even if I am guilty, there are only two alternatives. Either (according to MP1 and MP2 and MP4) I am justly punished or justly pardoned. Regardless: any one of all three outcomes would be just and what I deserve, and worst-case scenario is that (by MP3) I serve a punishment fit to my crime. So, on the assumption that some R-theory of hell is true, every outcome for me is just.

ARGUMENT 2
Assume some R-theory of hell is true. Furthermore, assume it is true that I am guilty of crimes that deserve punishment in hell. Furthermore, assume that my crimes have been pardoned. By MP4, the pardon is just. And, by MP6, I am not obligated to accept either the conviction or the pardon. And, by MP7, my punishment is stayed. So, on the assumption that some R-theory of hell is true, and I am guilty but also that my crimes have been pardoned and my punishment stayed, the outcome for me is just.

ARGUMENT 3
Assume some R-theory of hell is true. According to Arguments 1 and 2, every outcome for me is just. If every outcome for me is just, then there is no reason for me to be afraid of hell. Thus, on the assumption that some R-theory of hell is true, there is no reason for me to be afraid of hell.

That is the cluster of arguments for the conclusion that there is no reason for me to be afraid of hell. Let's consider some objections.

OBJECTION 1
"None of your premises comes from the Bible! Therefore, your rational principles are false and your arguments are useless." Reply: The fact that MP1 through MP7 are not stated in the Bible does not entail that MP1 through MP7 are false. Compare: The statement 'Torturing babies with knives is morally wrong' does not occur in the Bible, but it is true. In general, the fact that MP1 through MP7 are not stated in the Bible does not entail that MP1 through MP7 are inconsistent with Scripture. In order to reject any of MP1 through MP7, one must justify his or her rejection by establishing that the principle in question is incompatible with something in Scripture. The objector can identify which of MP1 through MP7 is defective and why -- otherwise, Objection 1 fails.

OBJECTION 2
"Sure, your rational principles make sense to us. But, God doesn't have to follow your principles! God makes and follows his own moral principles." Reply: Either God abides MP1 through MP7, or he does not. If God does, then my Arguments proceed. If God does not, then God's rationale for his preferred R-theory is arbitrary and incomprehensible, in which case, God is capricious and it's anybody's guess who goes to hell and why. But God is not capricious. So, Objection 2 fails.