Compensatory Afterlife or 'Drop in the Bucket' Theodicy

I'm not a fan of compensatory afterlife thinking, which would view earthly pain and suffering as a mere 'drop in the bucket' compared to heaven. Even when one's earthly life is dominantly characterized by suffering, billions and billions of years in the afterlife will more than make up for it.

First off, I'm not even sure

(1) Uncountable billions of years in heaven will help you forget about any earthly pain and suffering you had

is false. For all I know (1) is true. But (1) doesn't explain (much less justify) the existence of earthly pain and suffering. In order to justify the pain and suffering, we'd need some details, perhaps along the lines of

(2) Earthly life is a time of soul-making, in which souls are prepared for the afterlife

and

(3) Pain and suffering are necessary for soul-making

and

(4) The afterlife will more than compensate a person for any earthly pain and suffering

and

(5) The value of the quality of a person's earthly life pales in comparison to the value of the quality of a person's afterlife

The conjunction of (2) through (5) could be the start of a compensatory theodicy.

There seems to be a prima facie tension here. The theodicy implies that (and I'm just going to make up some numbers for the purpose of illustration) 0.0000001% years of badness is justified by 99.9999999% years of goodness.

Does the theodicist really want to stand behind this ratio, though? That is, does the theodicist really want to endorse (5)? One might wonder to what extent God endorses (5), if on Resurrection Day God judges how each person will spend 99.9999999% of his or her life based upon how they spent the 0.0000001% of it. In other words, God does not seem to consider the value of the quality of one's earthly life as a mere 'drop in the bucket' at all. God seems to weigh the quality of that 0.0000001% as much as he does the 99.9999999%. In which case, God seems to reject (5).

Does compensatory theodicy undermine itself? Insofar as (2) through (5) are inconsistent, it seems so.

Creation and Modality

Here is a rough sketch of something that I don't see discussed very often. Or, another way to put it would be to say that a certain conflation seems to occur pretty regularly during discussions of the problem of evil.

I'm not sure of the best way to sketch out this idea; but here goes.

Let '@' name the actual world. Consider the following set of propositions:

(1) God exists at every possible world.
(2) God exists at @.
(3) God created the cosmos ex nihilo.
(4) The cosmos exists at @.

So far, so good -- nothing very controversial here for most varieties of theism. But, suppose we add

(5) It is not the case that God created @.

to the set of (1) through (4). Maybe some theists will want to reject that (1) through (5) is consistent.

How about if we add

(6) God actualized the cosmos.
(7) It is not the case that God actualized @.

I'm not sure I've ever seen a discussion of (5) and (7) before. Instead, these and other details related to the usual Leibnizian scenarios of God's contemplation of and selection among possible worlds tend to get glossed over pretty rapidly.