Which 'me' will God resurrect?

There is a basic complication for Christian views of resurrection and afterlife that I don't see discussed very often.

Suppose I live to be 100 years old. On Resurrection Day, when God gets to my name on the list, God might resurrect 100-year-old me. But why that version of me? Why not resurrect 48-year-old me, or 21-year-old me? If I'm going to be around for eternity, I'd like to be young and healthy!

You get the idea.

But this situation is not unique to me, nor to people who grow old to be 100. What about, say, infants who die prematurely? They seem to be the opposite case.

Let's not suppose that God is arbitrary about which 'me' to resurrect -- but if God isn't arbitrary, what sort of non-arbitrary principle could he apply when making his decision?

One might theorize that there is, for each of us, an essence, or haecceity, and resurrection essentially involves embodying each person's essence. Of course, the soul might just as well fit this role, and perhaps this 'problem' is really the makings of a Christian argument for substance dualism.

Off the top of my head, it doesn't seem as though essences or souls would be of much help. Rather, it would only translate the problem. Instead of the question 'Which physical body do I resurrect?' the question would become 'Which set of properties do I instantiate (by resurrecting which physical body)?' or 'Which body do I put this soul into -- the 21-year-old body or the 100-year-old body?'

In the case of an infant who dies prematurely, it seems particularly clear that even the soul would be of no help in guiding God's decision regarding resurrection, insofar as it seems to represent a sort of worst case scenario in which an infant soul spends eternity in the body of an infant who died prematurely.

Resurrection, Hell, and Final Judgment

Let's suppose that a hypothetical person named McJones, a virtuous and well-liked husband, father, and grandfather, who died of old age and natural causes in the year 1952, was a committed atheist and unbeliever in God.

On the Day of Final Judgment, one of God's decisions to consider is whether to resurrect McJones.

For the purposes of this example, I am assuming that 'Day of Final Judgment' and 'Resurrection Day' are two ways of saying the same thing, and perhaps this is a harmless assumption. I am also assuming  that some form of materialism is true of human persons, which entails that McJones really is dead and that God really would need to resurrect McJones in order for McJones to stand before God on this day. Finally, let's assume that God is apprised and aware of all of the biographical details regarding McJones' virtue and unbelief.

Given these assumptions, is it reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones on the Day of Final Judgment?

Suppose some universalist theory is true, according to which everyone goes to heaven. In this case, considering that McJones was virtuous and well-liked in life, it seems reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones in order that McJones may appear before judgment and proceed to heaven.

Suppose that no universalist theory is true, however, and so not everyone qualifies for heaven. Furthermore, suppose that the biographical details of McJones' unbelief are sufficient to disqualify McJones from heaven. Finally, let's assume that God, because he was apprised of these biographical details at the time, understood this disqualification in 1952.

Given these assumptions, is it reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones on the Day of Final Judgment?

There are at least three cases:

(1) God resurrects McJones. McJones stands before judgment. McJones is banished to hell.

(2) God resurrects McJones. McJones stands before judgment. God annihilates McJones.

(3) God declines to resurrect McJones.

Of these three options, I think it is most reasonable to think that God chooses (3) and declines to resurrect McJones.