Can God choose which world to actualize?

Ok, so, I've posted a few things lately regarding the Leibnizian idea of God surveying possible worlds and choosing one among them to actualize. And it's been helping me organize my thoughts, at least.

I think I can boil down the thing that's worrying me the most into a simple question.

Suppose, at time t, God is surveying all of the possible worlds, and considering which one to actualize. Isn't, though, God's activity at time t an actual state of affairs?

I think that pretty much sums up my worry.

Does creation ex nihilo determine which possible world is actual?

The usual Leibnizian idea is that, prior to creation, God surveyed all the possible worlds, and actualized one of them. Assume that God is a temporal being, and that God's actions are temporal. Consider an arbitrary time t which is prior to creation ex nihilo and at which God is engaged in surveying the possible worlds.

Question: is there an actual world at time t?

If the answer is No, this would seem to entail that God's activity at t is occurring in every possible world. On this basis, one might be inclined to think that there is exactly one and only one possible world at time t (which, paradoxically, would suggest further that there is an actual world at time t). Maybe there are infinitely many worlds at time t which share an identical temporal segment; Plantinga probably dissusses this, I'll have to go back and look.

One way to think about God's situation at t might be this: at time t, every possible past is identical, but there are infinitely many possible futures. So, maybe God's activity at time t isn't so much that God is surveying possible worlds, but possible futures.

One way to spell things out, then, would be this. At time t, there are infinitely many possible pasts that are identical. At time t, there are infinitely many distinct possible futures. God's activity at time t is actual, i.e., belongs to the actual world, which is one of infinitely many identical pasts. At time t, it is indeed open to God to determine which world is actual -- which future becomes distinct from the infinitely many identical pasts -- even though God's activity at time t is actual (i.e., belongs to the actual world).

Compensatory Afterlife or 'Drop in the Bucket' Theodicy

I'm not a fan of compensatory afterlife thinking, which would view earthly pain and suffering as a mere 'drop in the bucket' compared to heaven. Even when one's earthly life is dominantly characterized by suffering, billions and billions of years in the afterlife will more than make up for it.

First off, I'm not even sure

(1) Uncountable billions of years in heaven will help you forget about any earthly pain and suffering you had

is false. For all I know (1) is true. But (1) doesn't explain (much less justify) the existence of earthly pain and suffering. In order to justify the pain and suffering, we'd need some details, perhaps along the lines of

(2) Earthly life is a time of soul-making, in which souls are prepared for the afterlife

and

(3) Pain and suffering are necessary for soul-making

and

(4) The afterlife will more than compensate a person for any earthly pain and suffering

and

(5) The value of the quality of a person's earthly life pales in comparison to the value of the quality of a person's afterlife

The conjunction of (2) through (5) could be the start of a compensatory theodicy.

There seems to be a prima facie tension here. The theodicy implies that (and I'm just going to make up some numbers for the purpose of illustration) 0.0000001% years of badness is justified by 99.9999999% years of goodness.

Does the theodicist really want to stand behind this ratio, though? That is, does the theodicist really want to endorse (5)? One might wonder to what extent God endorses (5), if on Resurrection Day God judges how each person will spend 99.9999999% of his or her life based upon how they spent the 0.0000001% of it. In other words, God does not seem to consider the value of the quality of one's earthly life as a mere 'drop in the bucket' at all. God seems to weigh the quality of that 0.0000001% as much as he does the 99.9999999%. In which case, God seems to reject (5).

Does compensatory theodicy undermine itself? Insofar as (2) through (5) are inconsistent, it seems so.

Which 'me' will God resurrect?

There is a basic complication for Christian views of resurrection and afterlife that I don't see discussed very often.

Suppose I live to be 100 years old. On Resurrection Day, when God gets to my name on the list, God might resurrect 100-year-old me. But why that version of me? Why not resurrect 48-year-old me, or 21-year-old me? If I'm going to be around for eternity, I'd like to be young and healthy!

You get the idea.

But this situation is not unique to me, nor to people who grow old to be 100. What about, say, infants who die prematurely? They seem to be the opposite case.

Let's not suppose that God is arbitrary about which 'me' to resurrect -- but if God isn't arbitrary, what sort of non-arbitrary principle could he apply when making his decision?

One might theorize that there is, for each of us, an essence, or haecceity, and resurrection essentially involves embodying each person's essence. Of course, the soul might just as well fit this role, and perhaps this 'problem' is really the makings of a Christian argument for substance dualism.

Off the top of my head, it doesn't seem as though essences or souls would be of much help. Rather, it would only translate the problem. Instead of the question 'Which physical body do I resurrect?' the question would become 'Which set of properties do I instantiate (by resurrecting which physical body)?' or 'Which body do I put this soul into -- the 21-year-old body or the 100-year-old body?'

In the case of an infant who dies prematurely, it seems particularly clear that even the soul would be of no help in guiding God's decision regarding resurrection, insofar as it seems to represent a sort of worst case scenario in which an infant soul spends eternity in the body of an infant who died prematurely.

Why you should refuse Pascal's Wager

Consider the following scenario. You're in a casino, and a table catches your eye because there are bundles of cash stacked from floor to ceiling behind it. A dozen men in sunglasses and tuxedos and holding double-barrel shotguns stand guard around the money. The dealer smiles as you approach the table, and gestures toward the cash. "This is more money than you can even possibly spend," he explains. "You have a 50/50 chance of winning it. And it costs you nothing to bet." You glance again at the cash, and the sunglassed guards, and your heart leaps with excitement as you prepare to say 'Yes! I'd like to place my bet!' As you are about to utter these words, however, you notice the dealer's hand move to rest upon a shiny pistol tucked in the waistband of his suit.

It is rational for you, at this moment of the story, to walk away from the table.

Some, in fact, might think that walking away from the table is the most rational action for you to perform at this point in the story.

Is this scenario importantly analogous to situations of Pascalian wagering? I tend to think so.

Creation and Modality

Here is a rough sketch of something that I don't see discussed very often. Or, another way to put it would be to say that a certain conflation seems to occur pretty regularly during discussions of the problem of evil.

I'm not sure of the best way to sketch out this idea; but here goes.

Let '@' name the actual world. Consider the following set of propositions:

(1) God exists at every possible world.
(2) God exists at @.
(3) God created the cosmos ex nihilo.
(4) The cosmos exists at @.

So far, so good -- nothing very controversial here for most varieties of theism. But, suppose we add

(5) It is not the case that God created @.

to the set of (1) through (4). Maybe some theists will want to reject that (1) through (5) is consistent.

How about if we add

(6) God actualized the cosmos.
(7) It is not the case that God actualized @.

I'm not sure I've ever seen a discussion of (5) and (7) before. Instead, these and other details related to the usual Leibnizian scenarios of God's contemplation of and selection among possible worlds tend to get glossed over pretty rapidly.

Resurrection, Hell, and Final Judgment

Let's suppose that a hypothetical person named McJones, a virtuous and well-liked husband, father, and grandfather, who died of old age and natural causes in the year 1952, was a committed atheist and unbeliever in God.

On the Day of Final Judgment, one of God's decisions to consider is whether to resurrect McJones.

For the purposes of this example, I am assuming that 'Day of Final Judgment' and 'Resurrection Day' are two ways of saying the same thing, and perhaps this is a harmless assumption. I am also assuming  that some form of materialism is true of human persons, which entails that McJones really is dead and that God really would need to resurrect McJones in order for McJones to stand before God on this day. Finally, let's assume that God is apprised and aware of all of the biographical details regarding McJones' virtue and unbelief.

Given these assumptions, is it reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones on the Day of Final Judgment?

Suppose some universalist theory is true, according to which everyone goes to heaven. In this case, considering that McJones was virtuous and well-liked in life, it seems reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones in order that McJones may appear before judgment and proceed to heaven.

Suppose that no universalist theory is true, however, and so not everyone qualifies for heaven. Furthermore, suppose that the biographical details of McJones' unbelief are sufficient to disqualify McJones from heaven. Finally, let's assume that God, because he was apprised of these biographical details at the time, understood this disqualification in 1952.

Given these assumptions, is it reasonable to think that God would resurrect McJones on the Day of Final Judgment?

There are at least three cases:

(1) God resurrects McJones. McJones stands before judgment. McJones is banished to hell.

(2) God resurrects McJones. McJones stands before judgment. God annihilates McJones.

(3) God declines to resurrect McJones.

Of these three options, I think it is most reasonable to think that God chooses (3) and declines to resurrect McJones.

Can the doctrine of The Fall be saved?

Suppose we boil the doctrine of The Fall down to the following basic thesis:

(F) The disobedient acts of the first human persons ruined all of creation and caused God to be hidden.

According to tradition, 'ruined all of creation' explains why the world contains as much pain, suffering, disaster, and mortality as it does. In short, we are told that (F) entails something like the further thesis

(E) The disobedient acts of the first human persons are the reason that the world contains pain, suffering, disaster, and mortality.

But we have every empirical reason to reject (E). We know from, e.g., the fossil record that creatures have been suffering and eating each other and dying for hundreds of millions of years prior to the activity of any human persons. So, we know that (E) is false. By modus tollens, (F) must be false too.
Which raises two questions: To what extent does the tradition still endorse (F) and (E)? If, on the other hand, the tradition gave up on (F) and (E), approximately when?

The extent to which 20th century analytic philosophers of religion have, e.g., defended premises and assumptions such that natural evil is a necessary condition for the observed regularities of the natural world, which regularities are themselves in turn necessary for the acquisition and development of moral knowledge in human persons. What's become a commonplace in discussions of the problem of divine hiddenness -- that it is necessary for God to hide in order to protect his creatures from epistemic coercion -- explicitly contradicts (F). Another prominent example might be Plantinga's suggestion that it is possible that each and every human person suffers from transworld depravity, according to which, for every human person, there is no possible world in which that person performs only morally good actions. Insofar as tradition emphasizes that The Fall is a human failure, it may create tension to think that every world that contains human persons was unavoidably bound to be a fallen world.

The Dilemma of Freedom in Eden

Traditional versions of Christianity appear to be inconsistent in a variety of ways. The following example is one way to draw this out. First, a very simple telling of the Christian story.

God created human persons to be free, and in the Garden human persons enjoyed this freedom in the presence of God. Human persons abused their freedom, the story goes, and chose to chase God away. Once God was chased away, creation has been ruined ever since, and God must remain hidden. This situation is irrevocable, unless God accomplishes the Incarnation and Atonement, which opens the possibility for human persons once again to be free and in the presence of God. This reunion must wait until heaven, however. Furthermore, not all human persons will choose to be reunited with God in heaven. Some will continue to use their freedom in order to freely reject God, and these human persons will spend the afterlife in hell.

That is the story. And the story entails the following dilemma.

(1) Adam is in Garden, enjoys creaturely freedom in the presence of God, and *has* the ability to chase God away.

(2) Adam is in Heaven, enjoys creaturely freedom in the presence of God, and *lacks* the ability to chase God away.

(1) and (2) can't both be true. They are inconsistent. Which means that the story itself is inconsistent, because it entails an inconsistent set of consequences. Which means the story is false.

One way to resolve this dilemma would be to add a third statement which could render (1) and (2) consistent, such as the following:

(3) The words 'creaturely freedom' denote one type of freedom in the Garden, and a distinct type of freedom in Heaven.

The set of (1) through (3) is consistent. Though, now you'll have to modify the story, in order to reflect (3). Which, reveals a further dilemma:

(4) Adam has Garden-freedom in the Garden, and this is the creaturely freedom that God intended for Adam to have when he created Adam.

(5) Adam has Heaven-freedom in Heaven, and this is the creaturely freedom that God intended for Adam to have when he created Adam.

(4) and (5) can't both be true. So, insofar as our story entails (1) through (5), our story is still false. As before, we might add an additional statement:

(6) When God created Adam, God intended Adam to have one type of freedom in the Garden and another distinct type of freedom in Heaven.

As before, (1) through (6) are consistent, and we can modify the story accordingly. Though, it is doubtful whether the story can be modified without doing damage to many versions of the traditional Christian account.

For example, many versions of the traditional Christian account seem to entail something along the lines of the following:

(7) Heaven is God's way of restoring creation back to the way God intended it to be.

Even if (7) is a rough way to put it, the general idea seems clear. But, (6) and (7) are inconsistent.

(6) When God created Adam, God intended Adam to have one type of freedom in the Garden and another distinct type of freedom in Heaven. 

(7) Heaven is God's way of restoring creation back to the way God intended it to be.

Insofar as (6) and (7) are inconsistent, and that the story entails (6) and (7), the story is false.

Every Retributivist Theory of Hell is a Failure

Call any theory of hell according to which God consigns human persons to hell in order to mete out the just punishment for their sins a retributivist theory of hell (hereafter, R-theory).

My claim is this: If any R-Theory of hell is true, then I have no reason to be afraid of hell. In support of this claim, I will provide a cluster of interrelated arguments.

I will employ no theological premises. Instead, my arguments will rest entirely upon rational moral principles which any reasonable person can be expected to accept. And this approach is fitting and appropriate, considering that R-theories are characteristically spelled out in terms of a rational moral framework of justice (e.g., crime and punishment).

For purposes of convenience, here is a list of the rational principles I will appeal to for support.

(MP1) Every crime must either be punished or pardoned.
(MP2) Any person who commits a crime ought to serve the punishment for that crime, unless it has been pardoned.
(MP3) Any punishment must fit the crime.
(MP4) For any crime, if that crime has been pardoned, then there exists a just and reasonable basis for which pardon has been granted.
(MP5) It is unjust to punish any person for a crime they didn't commit.
(MP6) It is not the case that a person who has been both convicted and pardoned of a crime is therefore obligated to accept either the conviction or the pardon for that crime.
(MP7) The punishment for any crime that has been justly pardoned is stayed.

Those are the principles. Here is the cluster of arguments.

ARGUMENT 1
Assume some R-theory of hell is true. Either I'm guilty of crimes that deserve punishment in hell, or I'm not. If I'm not guilty, then no worries, by MP5 I can't be sent to hell. Even if I am guilty, there are only two alternatives. Either (according to MP1 and MP2 and MP4) I am justly punished or justly pardoned. Regardless: any one of all three outcomes would be just and what I deserve, and worst-case scenario is that (by MP3) I serve a punishment fit to my crime. So, on the assumption that some R-theory of hell is true, every outcome for me is just.

ARGUMENT 2
Assume some R-theory of hell is true. Furthermore, assume it is true that I am guilty of crimes that deserve punishment in hell. Furthermore, assume that my crimes have been pardoned. By MP4, the pardon is just. And, by MP6, I am not obligated to accept either the conviction or the pardon. And, by MP7, my punishment is stayed. So, on the assumption that some R-theory of hell is true, and I am guilty but also that my crimes have been pardoned and my punishment stayed, the outcome for me is just.

ARGUMENT 3
Assume some R-theory of hell is true. According to Arguments 1 and 2, every outcome for me is just. If every outcome for me is just, then there is no reason for me to be afraid of hell. Thus, on the assumption that some R-theory of hell is true, there is no reason for me to be afraid of hell.

That is the cluster of arguments for the conclusion that there is no reason for me to be afraid of hell. Let's consider some objections.

OBJECTION 1
"None of your premises comes from the Bible! Therefore, your rational principles are false and your arguments are useless." Reply: The fact that MP1 through MP7 are not stated in the Bible does not entail that MP1 through MP7 are false. Compare: The statement 'Torturing babies with knives is morally wrong' does not occur in the Bible, but it is true. In general, the fact that MP1 through MP7 are not stated in the Bible does not entail that MP1 through MP7 are inconsistent with Scripture. In order to reject any of MP1 through MP7, one must justify his or her rejection by establishing that the principle in question is incompatible with something in Scripture. The objector can identify which of MP1 through MP7 is defective and why -- otherwise, Objection 1 fails.

OBJECTION 2
"Sure, your rational principles make sense to us. But, God doesn't have to follow your principles! God makes and follows his own moral principles." Reply: Either God abides MP1 through MP7, or he does not. If God does, then my Arguments proceed. If God does not, then God's rationale for his preferred R-theory is arbitrary and incomprehensible, in which case, God is capricious and it's anybody's guess who goes to hell and why. But God is not capricious. So, Objection 2 fails.

Are creatures morally obligated to worship God?

Given that God is wise and powerful and loving, given that he sustains creation from moment to moment, given that he is praiseworthy -- are creatures morally obligated to worship God? Perhaps the Christian tradition does entail that creatures are morally obligated because of such reasons to do certain things: worship God, ask God for forgiveness, seek salvation. Or, put another way, it is reasonable to think that the tradition entails that, say, failure to worship God is sinful, which the existence of a moral obligation to worship God would neatly explain.

The existence of such a moral obligation, though, might be seen to undercut typical responses to the problem of divine hiddenness.

For example, if creatures are morally obligated to worship God, this obligation seems to be less straightforward and mundane than the rest of our moral obligations (e.g., being kind, keeping promises, supporting loved ones). Which might tend one to think that God would have to take the unique non-obviousness of this obligation into consideration when carrying out his hiddenness campaign.